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Abstract
This study examines whether firms that appear to exhibit high sustainability reporting
quality are less likely to engage in earnings management activities, thereby delivering
financial information that is more transparent and reliable than that delivered by firms
that do not produce high-quality sustainability reports. I also investigate whether the
association between sustainability reporting quality and post-audit financial reporting
quality is conditional on audit effort. Analysis of data drawn from FTSE 350 compa-
nies covering 2007 to 2018 indicates that firms that produce high-quality sustainabil-
ity reports are significantly and negatively associated with earnings management
metrics. More importantly, this association is moderated by audit effort, measured by
audit fees, suggesting that sustainability reporting quality reflects factors considered
by auditors in their audit risk assessment practices. These results remain robust after
several sensitivity analyses. I conclude that firms that devote more resources to pro-
ducing high-quality sustainability reports are likely to demonstrate an overall commit-
ment to quality that alleviates auditors' concerns about the opportunistic use of
sustainability reporting and reduces business risk, thereby reducing the effort audi-
tors expend to verify financial reports.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
This study investigates the association between sustainability
reporting quality and post-audit financial reporting quality and
addresses the debate on the implications for sustainable business
strategies. Stakeholders' pressures and information demands have
changed significantly in recent years, and companies are required to
respond (Romero, Ruiz, & Fernandez-Feijoo, 2019). Sustainability
reporting is an important communication tool for demonstrating trans-
parency and effective governance and is specifically addressed to
stakeholders (Amran, Lee, & Devi, 2014). The need to provide trans-
parency to stakeholders is a driver of enhanced reporting quality
(Romero et al., 2019). Moreover, the organisational structure associ-
ated with the reporting process is important to the company's
reporting quality (Adams, 2002). This study examines the UK context,
which is characterised by high institutional pressures (Jensen &
Berg, 2012; Michelon, Pilonato, & Ricceri, 2015) and increasing levels
of mandatory social and environmental requirements (Romero
et al., 2019; Zorio, García-Benau, & Sierra, 2013). This study uses a
sample comprising the FTSE 350 index spanning 2007 to 2018 to pro-
vide evidence that high-quality sustainability reporting practices have
a significantly positive association with post-audit financial reporting
quality. Post-audit financial reporting quality is measured using earn-
ings management constructs computed on the basis of financial
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reports issued after audit completion (LópezPuertas-Lamy,
Desender, & Epure, 2017). The evidence also shows that the associa-
tion between sustainability reporting quality and post-audit financial
reporting quality is conditional on the audit effort level as measured
by audit fees.
This study's examination of the association between sustain-
ability reporting quality and post-audit financial reporting quality
differs from and extends prior research in several ways. First, most
studies examine associations with financial reporting quality by
focusing on corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance mea-
sured using performance scores such as the KLD database
(e.g. Hong & Andersen, 2011; Kim, Park, & Wier, 2012), the FTSE
4Good Global index (Chih, Shen, & Kang, 2008) or the EIRIS data-
base (Bozzolan, Fabrizi, Mallin, & Michelon, 2015). These perfor-
mance indices are less likely to screen out companies that merely
pay lip service to CSR to mask their socially irresponsible behav-
iour by highlighting CSR strengths and mitigating weaknesses (Chih
et al., 2008). A few studies focus on sustainability information dis-
closure to capture disclosure information standardisation levels
based on international indicators such as the GRI guidelines
(Martínez-Ferrero, Garcia-Sanchez, & Cuadrado-Ballesteros, 2015).
Rezaee and Tuo (2019) assess the quality of sustainability disclo-
sure on the basis of the application level of GRI frameworks to
capture levels of compliance with the guidelines. Companies enjoy
flexibility in their reporting activities because of the voluntary
nature of these guidelines and the lack of formal regulations, which
allows them to use the guidelines in a biased way (Michelon
et al., 2015). This study is different from prior studies in that it
assesses the quality of sustainability reporting using an index con-
structed on the basis of the adoption of substantive sustainability
reporting practices instead of developing a disclosure framework to
capture the level and variety of disclosures.1 These sustainability
reporting practices are specific to the organisational structure and
could alter a firm's reporting processes.
Second, this study contributes to the findings of studies on the
association between sustainability reporting quality and financial
reporting quality by investigating the moderating role of audit effort
in this association. Studies have focused on auditors' responses to
firms' CSR performance or environmental initiatives by analysing their
pricing decisions (e.g., LópezPuertas-Lamy et al., 2017; Sharma,
Sharma, & Litt, 2018). I extend these studies by investigating whether
companies' adoption of sustainability reporting practices is a factor
that auditors consider in their risk-assessment practices, which might
affect their audit effort.2 Moreover, my findings extend Dal Maso,
Lobo, Mazzi, and Paugam (2019), who show that the joint provision of
financial audit and sustainability assurance by the same audit firm is
unlikely to be driven by higher audit effort in auditors' assessment of
going-concern risk. I extend the findings in Dal Maso et al. (2019) by
showing that firms' adoption of sustainability reporting practices
improves sustainability reporting quality and reduces auditors' con-
cerns about the opportunistic use of sustainability information, lead-
ing to lower business risk. Consequently, when business risk is low,
auditors' efforts to verify financial reports are reduced. This is likely to
occur even when the financial audit and sustainability assurance are
provided by different audit firms.
Third, this study uses a sample that is more recent (2007–2018)
than the samples examined in prior research and provides evidence
from the United Kingdom (an important market to examine in isola-
tion). The literature suggests that both country orientation and sam-
pling period should be further researched, and especially that
companies' adoption of sustainability practices has changed signifi-
cantly in recent years and is affected by the firm's operational context
(Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2015; Michelon et al., 2015; Romero
et al., 2019; Yip, Van Staden, & Cahan, 2011). Moreover, this study
employs a variety of methods, including two alternative measures for
sustainability reporting quality and multiple proxies for post-audit
financial reporting quality, and performs various tests, including a full-
sample analysis using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and a
matched sample analysis using propensity score matching (PSM).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
reviews the related literature. Section 3 develops the study's hypothe-
ses. Section 4 describes the study's methodology, including variable
measurement, model specification and sample selection. Section 5 dis-
cusses the study's findings and robustness tests. Finally, Section 6
presents the study's conclusions.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature on the relationship between CSR and post-audit finan-
cial reporting quality provides mixed findings. A number of studies
have found a negative association between CSR and earnings manage-
ment, arguing that CSR firms are less likely to engage in earnings man-
agement because of ethical concerns and reputational damage,
whereas others use agency theory and managerial opportunism to find
a positive relationship between CSR and earnings management.3 Kim
1This is measured on a scale of 0 to 5: 0 if sustainability reports do not exist; 1 if
sustainability reports exist; 2 if sustainability reports exist and the company has a
sustainability committee affiliated with the board of directors; 3 if sustainability reports exist
and the reports are externally assured by an independent external assurance; 4 if
sustainability reports exist and the reports are externally assured by high-quality professional
auditors; 5 if executive compensation is linked to CSR/sustainability targets. In the
robustness test, I also use an alternative measure of sustainability reporting quality, following
Rezaee and Tuo (2019), using a scale variable that measures the assurance level (EXT_Assure)
regarding whether corporate sustainability reports are accompanied by external assurance
and whether these reports are assured by a professional auditor.
2LópezPuertas-Lamy et al. (2017) examine fraudulent financial reporting by using a proxy for
audit quality (i.e., audit fees). It is noteworthy that the pre-audit financial reporting quality
versus post-audit financial reporting quality constructs are generally unobservable, and the
literature on audit quality and financial reporting quality often underplay the distinction
between audit quality and financial reporting quality and use the same metrics to measure
both (Gaynor, Kelton, Mercer, & Yohn, 2016, p. 6). This study overcomes this problem and
uses earnings management metrics to measure post-audit financial reporting quality.
3The terms ‘corporate social responsibility’ and ‘sustainability’ have been used
interchangeably in the business literature. Following Rezaee and Tuo (2019), I attempt to
address the association between sustainability reporting quality and post-audit financial
reporting quality and do not claim to provide any evidence on causation.
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et al. (2012) investigate whether CSR firms constrain both real and
accrual-based earnings activities using data from a sample of US firms
covering 1991 to 2009 and find that CSR firms are less likely to
manipulate earnings through discretionary accruals and real earnings
activities. The study argues that companies' ethical behaviour affects
firms' incentives for transparency and is thus more likely to affect
management discretion in financial reporting. Similarly, Lim and
Choi (2013) investigate the association between CSR and earnings
management measured by both accrual-based earnings and real earn-
ings activities using data from a sample of Korean-listed firms covering
2009 to 2011 and find a significant and negative association between
CSR and real earnings activities. Hong and Andersen (2011) explore
the relationship between CSR and earnings management using data
from a sample of nonfinancial US firms covering 1995 to 2005 and
find that firms engaging in CSR are less likely to manage earnings; they
argue that ethics and reputation factors drive managers to produce
high-quality financial reports. Litt, Sharma, and Sharma (2014) find
that firms with pollution-prevention and climate-related initiatives
exhibit lower accrual-based earnings management, and Scholtens and
Kang (2013) find a negative association between CSR and earnings
management using a sample of firms in 10 Asian countries. Using an
international sample covering 2003 to 2009, Bozzolan et al. (2015)
find that CSR-oriented firms are less likely to engage in real earnings
than in accrual-based earnings management, especially in countries
with strong legal enforcement. The study argues that real earnings
management is a strategy that alters the underlying real operations of
the company, making it a suboptional choice for firms because of ethi-
cal issues and the risks to credibility and reputation. Choi and
Pae (2011) find that companies with higher ethical commitment levels
exhibit higher financial reporting quality than those with lower levels.
However, few studies have examined the positive association
between CSR and earnings management. For example,
Petrovits (2006) examines the use of corporate philanthropy
programmes to achieve earnings targets and provides evidence that
firms strategically contribute to their philanthropic foundations to
achieve earnings objectives. Chih et al. (2008) investigate the associ-
ation between CSR and the quality of publicly released financial
information using international data from a sample composed of
46 countries covering 1993 to 2002 and find that companies with
higher social responsibility engage in less earnings decrease/loss
avoidance but exhibit more earnings aggressiveness, moderated by
the institutional environment. Using data in a sample of 593 firms
from 26 countries covering 2002 to 2004, Prior, Surroca, and
Tribó (2008) find a positive association between CSR and earnings
management and argue that managers who manipulate earnings for
private benefit have incentives to engage in CSR activities to reduce
the likelihood of being scrutinised by stakeholders. The study claims
that CSR is a result of the principal–agent problem, wherein man-
agers are agents who utilise CSR as a way to maximise their own
private benefits. Calegari, Chotigeat, and Harjoto (2010) rely on the
work of Prior et al. (2008) and argue that CSR could be part of the
corporate culture and thus be established within the firm regardless
of the agency problem. The study finds that CSR enhances firms'
reporting quality using data from a sample of US firms covering
1991 to 2008.
A few studies conclude that the relationship between CSR and
earnings management is context specific and influenced by the firm's
political environment rather than by ethical considerations. Muttakin,
Khan, and Azim (2015) explore the relationship between CSR disclo-
sures and earnings quality proxied by earnings accruals and examine
whether CSR disclosures are context specific—that is, whether com-
panies dominated by powerful stakeholders are obliged to behave
responsibly to constrain earnings management, thereby reporting
higher-quality earnings to investors. The findings show that CSR-
oriented companies from export-oriented industries dominated by
powerful stakeholders provide more transparent financial reports by
constraining earnings management. Similarly, Yip et al. (2011) focus
on the oil and gas and food industries and show a negative relation-
ship between CSR and earnings management in the former and a posi-
tive relationship in the latter.
Several studies have examined the potential factors moderating
the relationship between the practices of CSR-oriented firms and
earnings management. Cho and Chun (2016) examine whether CSR is
associated with real earnings management and whether corporate
governance moderates this relationship using data from a sample of
Korean-listed firms covering 2005 to 2010. The study finds that
socially responsible firms can constrain real earnings activities and
that corporate governance strengthens the relationship between CSR
and real earnings management. The study argues that a firm with
good corporate governance is more successful in monitoring manage-
rial opportunistic behaviour and is therefore expected to reduce earn-
ings management. A recent study by Rezaee and Tuo (2019)
investigates the link between sustainability disclosures in environmen-
tal, social and governance reports and earnings quality using data from
a sample of listed firms in the GRI database covering 2009 to 2015
and finds that sustainability disclosure quantity is positively associated
with innate earnings quality and negatively associated with discretion-
ary earnings quality and that high sustainability disclosure quality
affects these associations. The study also finds that the corporate cul-
ture and prior-year sustainability performance moderate the relation-
ship between sustainability reporting and earnings quality. To the best
of my knowledge, no previous studies have explored the moderating
role of audit effort in the association between sustainability reporting
quality and post-audit financial reporting quality.
3 | HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
3.1 | Sustainability reporting quality and post-audit
financial reporting quality
The ethical perspectives of sustainability reporting posit that compa-
nies seek to be ethically responsible and will demonstrate their ethical
behaviour through their sustainable practices (Amran et al., 2014; Yip
et al., 2011). Reporting on sustainable practices creates transparency
and information impact and tends to reduce opportunistic behaviour
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(Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2015). CSR-oriented firms are fundamentally
more committed to creating value for shareholders and maintaining
financial transparency and are therefore less likely to engage in earn-
ings management practices through discretionary accruals or real
earnings activities (Chih et al., 2008). CSR-oriented firms that expend
effort and resources to meet social expectations are likely to constrain
earnings management, thereby providing investors with more trans-
parent and reliable financial information (Bozzolan et al., 2015;
Muttakin et al., 2015). Managers are facing the challenge of having to
enhance credibility and increase reporting quality to meet growing
concerns among stakeholders (Cohen & Simnett, 2014). Credible dis-
closures help to restrain managerial incentives to manipulate earnings
and restore confidence among shareholders and stakeholders
(Katmon & Al Farooque, 2017).
Sustainability reporting is a valuable communication tool that
helps managers signal their trustworthiness and communicate infor-
mation on their firms' sustainable development to stakeholders (Chen,
Srinidhi, Tsang, & Yu, 2016; Romero et al., 2019). The disclosure of
sustainability information provides useful financial and nonfinancial
information to shareholders and other stakeholders, which helps
mitigate managerial opportunism and unethical earnings manipulation
(Rezaee & Tuo, 2019). The institutionalisation concept of sustainable
practices in any firm provides a sound foundation for enhancing the
quality of reporting and the company's communication of its sustain-
ability information to stakeholders (Amran et al., 2014; Fernandez-
Feijoo, Romero, & Ruiz, 2018; Mio, Fasan, & Costantini, 2019).
Michelon et al. (2015) argue that sustainability reporting practices are
developed within an institutionalisation process and have become
prone to managerial capture. The organisational structure involved in
the reporting process is important to the company's reporting quality
(Adams, 2002).
The establishment of a sustainability committee is considered a
capital resource for a firm (Amran et al., 2014), which helps it to exer-
cise oversight of and monitor sustainability strategy and reporting,
which will influence any reduction in information asymmetries (Al-
Shaer & Zaman, 2019) and therefore improve reporting quality. More-
over, the assurance of sustainability reports reduces stakeholder pres-
sures because it enhances information credibility and increases
reporting quality (Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2018). Assurance allows
stakeholders to be increasingly involved in the firm's reporting process
and effect meaningful changes in them (Michelon et al., 2015). Getting
sustainability reports externally assured by high-quality external audi-
tors signals that the sustainability information is reliable, and it can
increase information transparency and credibility (Al-Shaer &
Zaman, 2018; Martínez-Ferrero, García-Sánchez, & Ruiz-Barbadillo,-
2018; Perego & Kolk, 2012; Peters & Romi, 2014). The inclusion of
explicit social targets in an executive compensation scheme may lead
to good sustainable performance (Kolk & Perego, 2014) and increase
corporate social commitment (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009;
Cordeiro & Sarkis, 2008), which is likely to affect firms' commitment
to higher reporting quality. Dalla Via and Perego (2020) find that a
stronger emphasis on executive compensation schemes linked to sus-
tainability targets enhances the quality of sustainability assurance.
Companies that disclose sustainability performance targets in their
annual reports in consultation with a sustainability committee and link
such disclosure to executive compensation are more likely to be com-
mitted to a third-party assurance to verify the credibility of such infor-
mation and thus improve reporting quality (Al-Shaer & Zaman, 2019;
Brown-Liburd & Zamora, 2014; Eccles, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014).4
The above discussion on managerial sustainability reporting prac-
tices highlights the importance of these practices for improving the
quality of sustainability reporting and therefore reducing managerial
opportunism and improving the firm's post-audit financial reporting
quality. This leads to my first hypothesis (H1):
H1. There is a positive association between sustainability reporting
quality and post-audit financial reporting quality.
3.2 | Moderating role of audit effort
According to agency theory, managers tend to act opportunistically
and hide information from shareholders, which leads to agency prob-
lems and information asymmetry between managers and stake-
holders. Companies disclose information to reduce information
asymmetry between stakeholders and help managers make decisions
(Frias-Aceituno, Rodríguez-Ariza, & Garcia-Sánchez, 2014; Martínez-
Ferrero et al., 2015). Shareholders might acquire control mechanisms
for monitoring managers' behaviour, such as external auditors, in
order to reduce agency costs, because their opinions are independent
of the firm (Pucheta-Martínez, Bel-Oms, & Rodrigues, 2019). Increas-
ing attention is being paid to the need for auditors to consider other
information attached to, or intended to be read with, the financial
statement as part of their risk-assessment practices (Simnett &
Huggins, 2014). As a result, managers are likely to spend resources on
auditing to ensure that the firm's system for producing both financial
and nonfinancial information is reliable (Chen et al., 2016; Knechel,
Krishnan, Pevzner, Shefchik, & Velury, 2012). The resource depen-
dence theory (RDT) highlights the importance of the dependency
between the firm and its external environment, suggesting that a firm
does not have full control over the allocation of the resources neces-
sary for its survival and that it is instead the key stakeholders who
influence the firm's decision making (Frooman, 1999). Thus, auditors
performing audit risk assessment may be concerned by how the firm
addresses and manages its stakeholders' relations; sustainability
reporting practices are considered key mechanisms for managing
these relationships (LópezPuertas-Lamy et al., 2017).
Financial statement auditors have a thorough understanding of
their clients and their internal and external environment, controls and
business strategies. Therefore, they are the most appropriate candi-
dates to consider the risks and financial statement implications
4Data from the ESG rating firm Sustainalytics show that 25% of the world's largest publicly
traded companies have board-level sustainability committees and only 3% of the largest
companies have tied executive compensation to voluntary sustainability targets (Ceres and
Sustainalytics, 2014).
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associated with sustainable strategies (Sharma et al., 2018, p. 210).
Moreover, because sustainability risks can have material conse-
quences on financial statements, auditors must obtain knowledge
about relevant sustainability information from either existing sustain-
ability reports or communication with the sustainability assurance
engagement team (Dal Maso et al., 2019). Dal Maso et al. (2019) show
that auditors that provide financial audits and sustainability assurance
for the same client do not charge higher audit fees because of a trans-
fer of knowledge from the CSR assurance team to the audit team,
which helps the auditor conduct more cost-effective financial audits.
Moreover, companies engaging in sustainability reporting practices
are more likely to receive more positive feedback from stakeholders,
develop skills for dealing with societal demands and reduce auditors'
concerns about the opportunistic use of CSR information, thereby
lowering business risk (LópezPuertas-Lamy et al., 2017). When busi-
ness risk is low, concerns about earnings management practices are
low, which leads to less audit effort and lower audit fees.
Given the above, firms that produce high-quality sustainability
reports are likely to demonstrate an overall commitment to quality
and reduce auditors' efforts spent in the verification of financial
reports because this commitment reduces business risk and alleviates
auditors' concerns about managerial opportunism. This leads to my
second hypothesis (H2):
H2. The positive association between sustainability reporting quality
and post-audit financial reporting quality is conditioned by
audit effort.
4 | RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA
4.1 | Empirical models
I use the model below to estimate the impact of sustainability
reporting quality (SUSQUAL) on post-audit financial reporting quality
(FRQ). (The key variables for post-audit financial reporting quality and
SUSQUAL are described separately below in sections 4.2 and 4.3, and
the control variables are described in section 4.4. The variables used
in this study are defined in Appendix A.) The model is as follows:
FRQ= β0 + β1SUSQUAL+ β2CO2emission + β3SIZE + β4LEV + β5ROA+
β6LIQUIDITY + β7MTB+ β8LOSS+ β9TENURE + β10BODindex +
β11Industry dummies+ β12Year dummies+ ϵ:
ð1Þ
I estimate the following model to examine the moderating role of
audit effort, measured by audit fees, in the association between sus-
tainability reporting quality and post-audit financial reporting quality:
FRQ= β0 + β1SUSQUAL+ β2lnAF + β3SUSQUAL lnAF + β4CO2emission +
β5SIZE + β6LEV + β7ROA+ β8LIQUIDITY + β9MTB+ β10LOSS+
β11TENURE + β12BODindex + β13Industry dummies+
β14Year dummies+ ϵ:
ð2Þ
All variables are defined in Appendix A. The interaction term SUS-
QUAL* ln_AF captures the role of audit effort in the association
between sustainability reporting quality and post-audit financial
reporting quality.
4.2 | Post-audit financial reporting quality measures
Post-audit financial reporting quality is measured using earnings man-
agement constructs computed on the basis of financial reports issued
after audit completion (LópezPuertas-Lamy et al., 2017). The first
measure I use for post-audit financial reporting quality is real earnings
management (REM), following prior studies (Cheng, Lee, &
Shevlin, 2016; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Doukakis, 2014; Qi, Lin,
Tian, & Lewis, 2017; Roychowdhury, 2006). To capture the total
effects of real earnings management, I follow Cohen and
Zarowin (2010) and use an aggregate measure of real earnings man-
agement calculated as the sum of abnormal discretionary expenses
multiplied by negative ones (thus, the higher the amount, the more
likely it is that the firm is cutting discretionary expenses) and abnormal
production costs (increasing production to spread the fixed costs of
production over a large number of units).5 The second measure is
performance-matched real earnings management (REM_pmatch),
where real earnings management is adjusted for the performance of a
matched firm, following Cheng et al. (2016). I also use the accrual-
based earnings management measure (AEM) as the third proxy, on the
basis of the literature (e.g., Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Dechow,
Kothari, & Watts, 1998; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995;
Doukakis, 2014; Mouselli, Jaafar, & Hussainey, 2012; Qi et al., 2017).6
(See Appendix B for detailed calculations of the earnings management
metrics). Finally, I compute an index with which to measure post-audit
firms' financial reporting quality (FRQ_index) following the same tech-
nique used in Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009) and then estimate a
principal component analysis (PCA) using Stata software employing
the study's proxies of earnings management. The factor solution con-
sists of two factors with eigenvalues larger than one (1.22). I multiply
the PCA estimate by a negative one so that it is increasing in reporting
quality.
4.3 | Sustainability reporting quality measures
This study assesses the quality of sustainability reporting on the
basis of the adoption of sustainability reporting practices that are
specific to the organisational structure and can lead to real changes
5In an untabulated analysis, I include an aggregate measure of real earnings management that
is equal to the sum of abnormal cash flows and abnormal discretionary expenses, both
multiplied by a negative one (thus, the higher the values, the more likely it is that the firm is
accelerating sales using aggressive price discounts and/or lenient credit terms and reducing
the amount of discretionary expenses). My inferences are qualitatively similar to those
reported when I use this alternative measure. Therefore, for parsimony, I report the results
using one aggregate measure of REM.
6In an untabulated analysis, I estimate the performance-matched accrual-based earnings
measure (AEM_pmatch) following Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005). The findings are
qualitatively similar to those produced when I use the accrual-based earnings proxy.
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in the firm's reporting processes. The existence of sustainability
reports does not imply an increase in the quality of the reported
information (Junior, Best, & Cotter, 2014); it is the existence of spe-
cific sustainability reporting practices that signal the quality of sus-
tainability reports. First, the establishment of a board-level
sustainability committee can be seen as an effective monitoring
device for ensuring the quality of the stakeholders' engagement pro-
cess and improving the range of sustainability disclosures, including
product safety, charitable contributions and environmental health
(Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). The existence of a board-level sus-
tainability committee with special oversight over the sustainability
process and reporting helps to promote sustainability issues and
increase reporting quality (Al-Shaer & Zaman, 2016). Second, provid-
ing an independent external assurance of sustainability reports
enhances the quality of reporting and mitigates stakeholders' con-
cerns, and the quality of these reports will be greater when assur-
ance is provided by an auditing professional (Al-Shaer &
Zaman, 2016; Simnett, Vanstraelen, & Chua, 2009). Third, compa-
nies concerned about sustainability are likely to link executive com-
pensation to sustainability targets to sharpen the focus on
sustainability issues and improve the quality of relevant reporting
(Al-Shaer & Zaman, 2019; Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Dalla
Via & Perego, 2020). Firms that include sustainability-related targets
in their executive compensation plans can hold their executives
accountable for any irresponsible behaviour (Maas, 2018; Maas &
Rosendaal, 2016). Such an inclusion should enhance the reliability of
sustainability reports, thereby improving their quality.
Building on the typology applied in Al-Shaer and Zaman (2016) to
assess sustainability reporting quality, this study employs a coding
scale based on five thresholds; it uses a score from 0 to 5 to provide
an indicator of the quality of sustainability reporting practices. The
scores for sustainability reporting quality (SUSQUAL) are as follows:
0 if sustainability reports do not exist; 1 if sustainability reports exist;
2 if sustainability reports exist and the company has a sustainability
committee affiliated with the board of directors; 3 if sustainability
reports exist and the reports are externally assured by an independent
external assurance; 4 if sustainability reports exist and the reports are
externally assured by a high-quality professional auditor; and 5 if exec-
utive compensation is linked to CSR/sustainability targets (noting that
other criteria should be fulfilled to achieve the highest score). In a
robustness test, I also consider an alternative measure of sustainability
reporting quality, following Rezaee and Tuo (2019), by using a scale
variable that measures the assurance level (EXT_Assure) based on
whether corporate sustainability reports are accompanied by external
assurance and whether these reports are assured by a professional
auditor.7
4.4 | Control variables
I include various control variables that could affect sustainability
reporting and financial reporting practices. I control for sustainability
performance, measured by the level of a firm's total carbon emissions
in the prior year (CO2_emission). The literature links environmental,
social and governance (ESG) sustainability performance to firms' finan-
cial performance and earnings management (e.g., Martínez-Ferrero,
Banerjee, & García-Sánchez, 2016; Ng & Rezaee, 2015; Rezaee &
Tuo, 2019). Good sustainability performers are likely to produce high-
quality sustainability reports to signal good behaviour to the market
and communicate relevant financial and nonfinancial information to all
stakeholders, which will help mitigate managerial opportunistic behav-
iour and unethical earnings management.8 The literature also finds
that corporate governance helps reduce firms' earnings management
and improve financial reporting quality (Cho & Chun, 2016; Kim
et al., 2012). I use a composite measure for corporate board quality
(BOD_index) computed by totalling the proxies for five board charac-
teristics. The board variables are defined as follows: BODSIZE board
size (dummy variable: 1 if the number of board members is higher than
the industry median and 0 otherwise); BODIND board independence
(dummy variable: 1 if the percentage of independent directors on the
board is higher than the industry median and 0 otherwise); BODMEET
board meeting (dummy variable: 1 if the number of board meetings is
higher than the industry median and 0 otherwise); BODEXP board
expertise (dummy variable: 1 if the percentage of board members with
financial expertise is higher than the industry median, 0 otherwise);
and DUALITY board duality role [dummy variable: 1 if the chief execu-
tive officer (CEO) and the board chair roles are separate, 0 otherwise].
I also control for audit tenure (TENURE), measured as the number of
years of audit engagement, because earnings management might dif-
fer depending on the tenure of the auditor (LópezPuertas-Lamy
et al., 2017).9
Finally, I control for firm-specific variables that have been used
in the literature for the association between earnings management
and CSR (e.g., Cho & Chun, 2016; Kim et al., 2012; LópezPuertas-
Lamy et al., 2017; Prior et al., 2008). Thus, I control for the firm's
size (SIZE) measured as the natural logarithm of market capit-
alisation; leverage (LEV) measured as the total debt to total assets
ratio; the firm's financial performance (ROA) measured as the
return-on-assets ratio; liquidity, measured as the sum of accounts
receivable and inventory to total assets; market-to-book ratio (MTB),
calculated as the market value of equity to the book value of
equity; loss (LOSS), measured as an indicator variable equal to one
when the current year's net income is negative and zero otherwise;
and industry and year dummies.
7Note that CSR/sustainability assurance is markedly different from other non-audit services
because it goes beyond focusing on specific matters such as tax and information technology
to provide firm-wide CSR-specific knowledge to auditors. Moreover, unlike the voluntary
nature of non-audit services, regulators are likely to require assurance of CSR reports in the
near future (Dal Maso et al., 2019).
8Sustainability performance is measured as the level of a firm's total carbon emissions in the
prior year (CO2_emission). This measure is specific to the firm's environmental performance
and does not assess sustainability performance at a broad level. Therefore, it has limitations;
nevertheless, as it is employed as a control variable, it should not invalidate the analysis.
9I also control for audit committee independence using an indicator variable equal to 1 if the
audit committee comprises wholly independent directors and 0 otherwise. I had to drop this
variable due to lack of variation.
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4.5 | Sample and data
The study's sample consists of FTSE 350 companies continuously
listed on the London Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2018.10 The FTSE
350 companies represent the highest market capitalisation and are
the focus of attention among investors, regulators and professional
bodies. The study's time period is appropriate for investigating
changes in sustainability reporting practices over the last decade and
provides a sample that is more recent than are the samples used in
prior research. I use Thomson Reuters Asset4, which provides data on
the adoption and nonadoption of sustainability reporting practices.11 I
supplement this with information extracted from companies' annual
reports to extract information about the disclosure of sustainability-
related incentives in executive remuneration reports. Financial data
were collected from DataStream. The study is based on an initial sam-
ple of 3,228 firm-year observations distributed into 10 industrial sec-
tors on the basis of the Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB). I
remove financial firms because they have a unique regulatory environ-
ment. I also remove observations with missing data from Asset4 to
compute the sustainability reporting quality index and a few
observations for some of the financial variables. The final sample used
in this study consists of 1,186 firm-year observations.
5 | EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1 | Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables in the
study model. For the dependent variables, the mean values of REM,
REM_pmatch and AEM are −0.0217, −0.0128 and −0.0387, respec-
tively, suggesting that, on average, firms in this sample do not seem to
engage in manipulation to boost earnings. For the variables of inter-
est, using a 0–5 scale measure, the mean value of SUSQUAL is 3.628,
and the mean value of EXT_Assure is 1.672 on the basis of a 0–2 scale
measure. For the control variables, the mean value of CO2_emission is
12.096, equivalent to 3,202,276 tons of total carbon emissions, and
the mean value of SIZE is 14.518, equivalent to £8,428,377 of market
capitalisation. The mean value of LEV is 0.233, the mean value of ROA
is 0.08, the mean value of LIQUIDITY is 0.252, and the mean value of
MTB is 3.635. I find that 11.81% of firms in the sample reported a loss,
which is higher than the value of 10.4% reported in LópezPuertas-
Lamy et al. (2017) and lower than the value of 21% reported by Chen
et al. (2016). The mean value of TENURE is 6.552, which is lower than
the value of 8.675 reported by LópezPuertas-Lamy et al. (2017).
Finally, the mean value of BOD_index is 2.373, and the mean value of
audit fees is £4,128,578.
Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for all variables
used in this study. Notably, SUSQUAL is negatively correlated with
REM, indicating a significant overall negative relationship with REM
10Considering continuously listed companies allows for balanced data in the panel dataset. A
balanced dataset contains all elements observed in all time frames, whereas an unbalanced
dataset contains data where, in certain years, the data category is not observed. Using a
balanced panel may lead to eliminated observations. However, the power of a balanced or
equal-allocation design is typically higher than the power of the corresponding unbalanced
design (Al-Shaer & Zaman, 2019, p. 238).
11The Asset4 database, which has been used in the literature (e.g. Eccles et al., 2014; Cheng
et al. 2014; Birkey et al. 2016; Haque 2017; Al-Shaer & Zaman, 2019; Dal Maso et al., 2019),
provides objective, relevant, and systematic ESG information based on key performance
indicators. ASSET4 research analysts collect data from sources, including stock exchange
filings, annual financial and sustainability reports, nongovernmental organisations' websites,
and various news sources (Eccles et al., 2014).
TABLE 1 Summary statistics
Mean SD P25 P50 P75
REM −0.0217 0.2667 −0.1354 −0.0186 0.1038
REM_pmatch −0.0128 0.2175 −0.1043 −0.0035 0.1054
AEM −0.0387 0.0512 −0.0596 −0.0314 −0.0129
FRQ_index 0.0000 1.3489 −0.7130 −0.0266 0.6002
SUSQUAL 3.6282 0.5324 3.0000 4.0000 4.0000
EXT_Assure 1.6728 0.4712 1.0000 2.0000 2.0000
CO2_emission 12.0965 2.4312 10.4129 11.8916 13.5076
SIZE 14.5184 1.4879 13.5231 14.2669 15.2979
LEV 0.2328 0.1724 0.0912 0.2236 0.3399
ROA 0.0804 0.0862 0.0401 0.0712 0.1153
LIQUIDITY 0.2521 0.1854 0.1112 0.2271 0.3409
MTB 3.6358 7.4531 1.4500 2.5500 4.2800
LOSS 0.1181 0.3228 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
TENURE 6.5524 4.0281 3.0000 6.0000 9.0000
BOD_index 2.3736 0.9557 2.0000 2.0000 3.0000
AF 4,128,578 7,968,715 553,000 1,200,000 3,900,000
ln_AF 26.8133 2.6256 25.1053 26.4914 28.5065
Variables winsorised to adjust for outliers. Variables are as defined in Appendix A.
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and suggesting that higher-quality sustainability reporting constrains
earnings management. The table also shows that CO2_emission, LEV,
LIQUIDITY and LOSS are positively and significantly correlated with
REM, whereas ROA and MTB are negatively and significantly corre-
lated with REM. None of the correlations between control variables is
high enough to raise a multicollinearity issue, as the highest variance
inflation factor (VIF) score for the regressions is 2.75.12
5.2 | Regression analysis
5.2.1 | Association between sustainability reporting
quality and post-audit financial reporting quality
Table 3 presents the association between sustainability reporting
quality (SUSQUAL) and post-audit financial reporting quality measured
using real earnings management (REM) in Model 3.1, performance-
matched real earnings management (REM_pmatch) in Model 3.2,
accrual-based earnings (AEM) in Model 3.3, and the financial reporting
quality index (FRQ_index) in Model 3.4. The results show that the
coefficient of SUSQUAL is negative and significant at the 5% level in
Model 3.1 and at the 10% level in Model 3.3 and is positive and signif-
icant at the 5% level in Model 3.4. These results are consistent with
the literature (Bozzolan et al., 2015; Choi & Pae, 2011; Kim
et al., 2012; Litt et al., 2014) and suggest that companies that engage
in sustainability reporting practices and produce high-quality sustain-
ability reports signal their true ethical behaviour, which affects firms'
incentives for transparency and are thus more likely to constrain earn-
ings manipulation activities and improve financial reporting quality.
The results support my first hypothesis on the positive association
between sustainability reporting quality and post-audit financial
reporting quality.
The results for the control variables show that the coefficient
of CO2_emission is positive and significant at the 1% level with real
earnings management metrics (Models 3.1 and 3.2) but negative and
significant at the 1% level with accrual-based earnings (Model 3.3)
and in Model 3.4 with the FRQ_index, suggesting that firms produc-
ing high levels of carbon emissions are considered bad performers,
and they may want to minimise credibility and reputation risks by
reducing their chances of being detected in accrual-based earnings
and therefore performing real earnings activities for accrual-based
earnings. Firm leverage (LEV) is significantly and positively associ-
ated with earnings management metrics (see Models 3.1 to 3.3) and
significantly and negatively associated with the FRQ_index,
suggesting that firms involved in debt contracting decisions have
the motivation to engage in earnings activities. Earnings manage-
ment metrics are also linked with the financial performance of the
firm, measured by ROA, where profitable firms have the resources
required to improve financial reporting quality and are less likely to
engage in earnings management. Finally, LIQUIDITY is significantly
and positively associated with earnings management metrics,
12I include one measure of earnings management in Table 2. I also find that the SUSQUAL
variable is negatively and significantly correlated with other earnings management metrics
included in this study (untabulated).
TABLE 3 Sustainability reporting quality and post-audit financial reporting quality
REM REM_pmatch AEM FRQ_index
Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 Model 3.4
SUSQUAL −0.0623** [−1.98] −0.0382 [−1.22] −0.0039* [−1.89] 0.1960** [1.91]
CO2_emission 0.0299*** [4.95] 0.0316*** [5.38] −0.0032*** [−4.78] −0.1033*** [−5.21]
SIZE −0.0097 [−0.97] −0.0068 [−0.70] −0.0008 [−0.99] 0.0199 [0.63]
LEV 0.1946* [1.90] 0.2190** [2.05] −0.0081 [−0.98] −0.8260** [−2.46]
ROA −1.2756*** [−4.66] −0.0992 [−0.41] 0.0642 [1.36] 2.3549*** [2.98]
LIQUIDITY 0.3954*** [4.24] 0.3477*** [3.78] 0.0245** [2.37] −1.6104*** [−5.65]
MTB 0.002 [1.09] 0.0018 [0.96] −0.0003 [−1.54] −0.0078 [−1.24]
LOSS −0.0759 [−1.39] −0.0671 [−1.39] 0.0052 [0.76] 0.2650* [1.72]
TENURE −0.0042 [−1.20] −0.0060* [−1.90] 0.0001 [0.39] 0.0094 [0.86]
BOD_index −0.0175 [−1.16] −0.0171 [−1.17] −0.0020* [−1.77] 0.0776* [1.69]
Industry Included Included Included Included
Year Included Included Included Included
Intercept −0.2978 [−1.22] −0.4903** [−2.01] −0.008 [−0.39] 1.5519** [2.00]
R2 0.1234 0.0717 0.3331 0.1032
N 1,186 1,186 1,186 1,186
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
Variables are as defined in Appendix A.
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TABLE 4 The moderating role of audit effort
Panel A: All firms (n = 1,186)
REM REM_pmatch AEM FRQ_index
Model 4.1 Model 4.2 Model 4.3 Model 4.4
SUSQUAL −0.6485**
[−2.29]
−0.3396** [−2.19] −0.0561** [−2.33] 2.1940** [2.41]
ln_AF −0.2050***
[−2.78]
−0.0950** [−2.35] 0.003 [0.49] 0.6198*** [2.62]
SUSQUAL*
ln_AF
0.0415**
[2.08]
0.0221** [2.02] 0.0037** [2.16] −0.1414** [−2.20]
CO2_emission 0.0535***
[5.53]
0.0256*** [4.83] −0.0072*** [−8.80] −0.1514*** [−4.88]
SIZE −0.0083
[−0.91]
−0.0022 [−0.44] −0.001 [−1.28] 0.0164 [0.56]
LEV 0.2266**
[2.35]
0.1686*** [3.19] −0.0126 [−1.53] −0.8912*** [−2.88]
ROA −1.2543***
[−5.82]
−0.0495 [−0.42] 0.0590*** [3.22] 2.3045*** [3.33]
LIQUIDITY 0.3160***
[3.19]
0.2171*** [4.00] 0.0362*** [4.29] −1.4661*** [−4.61]
MTB 0.0021
[1.21]
0.0012 [1.26] −0.0002 [−1.57] −0.008 [−1.44]
LOSS −0.0824
[−1.49]
−0.0477 [−1.58] 0.0052 [1.10] 0.2844 [1.61]
TENURE −0.0027
[−0.78]
−0.0016 [−0.85] −0.0001 [−0.40] 0.0061 [0.55]
BOD_index −0.02
[−1.56]
−0.0133* [−1.92] −0.0017 [−1.61] 0.0844** [2.08]
Industry Included Included Included Included
Year Included Included Included Included
Intercept 2.3829**
[2.29]
0.9808* [1.72] 0.0813 [0.92] −6.8533** [−2.05]
R2 0.1548 0.1076 0.3986 0.1282
Panel B
Audit fees = High (n = 833) Audit fees = Low (n = 353)
REM REM_pmatch AEM FRQ_index REM REM_pmatch AEM FRQ_index
Model 4.5 Model 4.6 Model 4.7 Model 4.8 Model 4.9 Model 4.10 Model 4.11 Model 4.12
SUSQUAL 0.0017
[0.11]
0.0036
[0.25]
−0.0014
[−0.45]
−0.0134
[−0.16]
−0.0757**
[−2.09]
−0.0441
[−1.24]
−0.0029
[−0.96]
0.3475**
[1.68]
CO2_emission 0.0110 ***
[2.87]
0.0123***
[3.35]
−0.0043***
[−5.48]
−0.0606***
[−2.81]
0.0481***
[3.32]
0.0461***
[3.23]
−0.001
[−0.86]
−0.2738***
[−3.30]
SIZE 0.0017
[0.36]
−0.0008
[−0.17]
−0.0009
[−0.87]
−0.0004
[−0.02]
−0.0175
[−1.22]
−0.0062
[−0.44]
0.0003
[0.23]
0.0657
[0.80]
LEV −0.0304
[−0.54]
0.0099
[0.18]
−0.0147
[−1.29]
0.0762
[0.24]
0.3800***
[3.05]
0.4448***
[3.62]
−0.0114
[−1.10]
−2.4163***
[−3.38]
ROA −0.4489***
[−3.63]
0.3003**
[2.54]
0.1145***
[4.56]
−0.0023
[−0.00]
−1.2548***
[−4.04]
−0.2985
[−0.97]
−0.0615**
[−2.38]
4.3899**
[2.47]
LIQUIDITY 0.3955***
[6.99]
0.3051***
[5.65]
0.0173
[1.50]
−2.0606***
[−6.49]
0.2995**
[2.09]
0.3278**
[2.31]
0.0800***
[6.67]
−1.9994**
[−2.43]
MTB −0.0004
[−0.34]
−0.0004
[−0.40]
−0.0004*
[−1.82]
0.003 [0.51] 0.0039*
[1.92]
0.0027
[1.33]
−0.0001
[−0.86]
−0.0188
[−1.60]
LOSS −0.026
[−0.91]
−0.0312
[−1.15]
0.0107*
[1.85]
0.149 [0.93] −0.0583
[−0.59]
−0.0673
[−0.69]
−0.0146*
[−1.78]
0.3987
[0.71]
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indicating that firms with high levels of inventory and accounts
receivable are more likely to engage in earnings activities, as these
items are the most difficult areas to audit (LópezPuertas-Lamy
et al., 2017).
5.2.2 | Moderating role of audit effort
Table 4 tests my second hypothesis about whether the positive asso-
ciation between sustainability reporting quality and post-audit
TABLE 4 (Continued)
TENURE −0.0048***
[−2.60]
−0.0044**
[−2.50]
0.001 [0.12] 0.0265**
[2.58]
0.0046
[0.84]
−0.0002
[−0.04]
0.0004
[0.91]
−0.0124
[−0.39]
BOD_index 0.0024 0.0027 −0.0021 −0.0108 −0.0396** −0.0365** −0.0017 0.2256**
[0.34] [0.41] [−1.55] [−0.28] [−2.11] [−1.98] [−1.35] [2.11]
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Intercept −0.3922***
[−3.21]
−0.3858***
[−3.31]
0.0099
[0.40]
2.0873***
[3.04]
−0.0595
[−0.16]
−0.1881
[−0.52]
−0.0539*
[−1.78]
0.6925
[0.33]
R2 0.2264 0.1461 0.3628 0.1691 0.3372 0.2414 0.6449 0.275
Panel C
The provision of sustainability assurance and financial audit by
the same audit firm
The provision of sustainability assurance and financial audit by
different audit firms
REM REM_pmatch AEM FRQ_index REM REM_pmatch AEM FRQ_index
Model 4.13 Model 4.14 Model 4.15 Model 4.16 Model 4.17 Model 4.18 Model 4.19 Model 4.20
SUSQUAL −1.9689***
[−2.72]
−0.8226**
[−2.06]
−0.2025**
[−2.63]
6.9195***
[2.93]
−0.7917**
[−2.04]
−0.4255**
[−2.03]
−0.0085
[−0.31]
2.5198**
[2.04]
ln_AF −0.8081***
[−3.72]
−0.2974**
[−2.47]
−0.0582**
[−2.51]
2.4900***
[3.51]
−0.2313**
[−2.33]
−0.1172**
[−2.18]
0.0081
[1.16]
0.6993**
[2.22]
SUSQUAL*
ln_AF
0.1406***
[2.66]
0.0608**
[2.09]
0.0146**
[2.59]
−0.5035***
[−2.93]
0.0501*
[1.82]
0.0265*
[1.79]
0.0003
[0.14]
−0.1557**
[−1.79]
COE2_emission 0.2174***
[5.25]
0.0774***
[3.38]
−0.003
[−0.69]
−0.5373***
[−3.98]
0.0497***
[4.04]
0.0263***
[3.96]
−0.0071***
[−8.23]
−0.1533***
[−3.94]
SIZE −0.0167
[−0.73]
−0.0068
[−0.54]
−0.0041*
[−1.69]
0.0544
[0.73]
−0.0062
[−0.52]
−0.0008
[−0.13]
−0.0006
[−0.76]
0.0113
[0.30]
LEV 0.7283***
[2.76]
0.3280**
[2.25]
0.0348
[1.24]
−2.0042**
[−2.33]
0.0574
[0.45]
0.1163*
[1.69]
−0.014
[−1.57]
−0.5343
[−1.32]
ROA −0.6162
[−1.04]
0.3157
[0.96]
0.3632***
[5.74]
−0.6384
[−0.33]
−1.2362***
[−4.44]
−0.0391
[−0.26]
−0.0002
[−0.01]
2.4479***
[2.78]
LIQUIDITY 0.2494
[0.81]
0.4309**
[2.53]
−0.0188
[−0.57]
−2.0903**
[−2.08]
0.196 [1.47] 0.1368*
[1.90]
0.0538***
[5.74]
−1.0885**
[−2.58]
MTB 0.0138
[1.41]
0.0065
[1.20]
−0.0019*
[−1.80]
−0.0344
[−1.08]
0.0024
[1.21]
0.0012
[1.08]
−0.0002
[−1.16]
−0.0086
[−1.35]
LOSS 0.1775
[1.38]
0.0956
[1.34]
0.0269*
[1.96]
−0.6723
[−1.60]
−0.0698
[−0.93]
−0.0498
[−1.23]
0.0044
[0.84]
0.2984
[1.26]
TENURE −0.0041 −0.0074* −0.0007 0.0312 −0.0027 0 0.0004 −0.0027
[−0.58] [−1.89] [−0.95] [1.36] [−0.57] [−0.01] [1.31] [−0.18]
BOD_index −0.0011
[−0.04]
−0.0072
[−0.52]
−0.0044
[−1.65]
0.0622
[0.76]
−0.0267*
[−1.80]
−0.0146*
[−1.82]
−0.0006
[−0.55]
0.0890*
[1.90]
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Intercept 8.5150*** 2.9511* 0.8962*** −26.9920*** 2.6894* 1.2558* −0.0264 −7.9395*
R2 0.4803 0.4352 0.6218 0.442 0.1525 0.1135 0.4645 0.1349
N 304 304 304 304 882 882 882 882
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
Variables are as defined in Appendix A.
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financial reporting quality is conditional on audit effort. I use the inter-
action term SUSQUAL* ln_AF to test the interaction of SUSQUAL and
ln_AF on the financial reporting quality metrics.13 Panel A Models 4.1
to 4.4 are analogous to Models 3.1 to 3.4 in terms of their dependent
variables. Consistent with the previous findings, the results show that
companies that publish high-quality sustainability reports are more
likely to constrain earnings management and hence improve financial
reporting quality as indicated by the coefficients of SUSQUAL in
Models 4.1 to 4.4. The results also show that the level of audit effort,
proxied by audit fees, is significantly and negatively associated with
real earnings activities (see Models 4.1 and 4.2) and significantly and
positively associated with the FRQ_index (see Model 4.4), indicating
that financial reporting quality is more likely to improve when the
audit effort level is high. By contrast, firms may resort to hard-to-
detect real earnings manipulation that is less subject to auditor scru-
tiny to meet their reporting objectives (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). The
real economic actions that companies engage in to meet specific earn-
ings targets are difficult to confront by auditors or regulators (Graham,
Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005).14 More importantly, Models 4.1 and 4.2
show a significant and positive coefficient on the interaction term
SUSQUAL* ln_AF, which indicates that, when the audit effort level is
low, the quality of sustainability reports is expected to be high in con-
straining real earnings management. Moreover, the interaction term
SUSQUAL* ln_AF is significant and negative with the FRQ_index (see
Model 4.4), confirming the moderating effect of audit effort and
suggesting that that sustainability reporting quality reflects factors
that auditors consider in their audit risk-assessment practices. This
result suggests that firms that devote more resources to produce
high-quality sustainability reports are more likely to demonstrate an
overall commitment to quality that alleviates auditors' concerns
related to the opportunistic use of sustainability reporting and reduces
business risk, thereby reducing auditors' efforts in the verification of
financial reports.
The results also have economic significance, as computed follow-
ing Huang, Kerstein and Wang (2018). For example, Model 4.4 shows
that the effect of audit effort, proxied by ln_AF on the FRQ_index, is
0.6198, whereas the effect of ln_AF and SUSQUAL on the FRQ_index is
0.4784 (i.e., the sum of 0.6198 and −0.1414). These coefficients sug-
gest that, when moving from the first quartile (25.1053) to the third
(28.5065) of ln_AF, for the effect of audit effort, the increase in finan-
cial reporting quality is 210.8%.15 However, when moving from the
first quartile (25.1053) to the third (28.5065) of ln_AF, for the effect of
audit effort and sustainability reporting, the increase in financial
reporting quality is 162.7%, which means that the positive association
between sustainability reporting quality and financial reporting quality
is lower when the level of audit effort is higher.16 This finding suggests
a moderating effect of audit effort on the association between sus-
tainability reporting quality and post-audit financial reporting quality
and confirms my second hypothesis that the positive association
between sustainability reporting quality and post-audit financial
reporting quality is conditional on audit effort.
In Table 4 Panel B, I divide the sample into firms that pay higher
audit fees (Models 4.5 to 4.8) and firms that pay lower audit fees
(Models 4.9 to 4.12) on the basis of the median value of AF. I use the
same modelling technique as that used in Table 3. The results show
that, when audit fees are lower, SUSQUAL is significantly and nega-
tively associated with REM at the 5% level (see Model 4.9) and is sig-
nificantly and positively associated with the FRQ_index at the 5% level
(see Model 4.12). When audit fees are higher, the association
between sustainability reporting quality and post-audit financial
reporting quality is not pronounced, confirming the moderating effect
of audit effort and thus my second hypothesis that the positive asso-
ciation between sustainability reporting quality and post-audit finan-
cial reporting quality is conditional on the audit effort. The results for
the control variables are generally consistent with the findings shown
in Table 3. Additionally, I find that, when audit fees are higher, auditor
tenure (TENURE) is significantly and negatively associated with REM
(see Models 4.5 and 4.6) and significantly and positively associated
with the FRQ_index (see Model 4.8), indicating that the higher the
auditor tenure, the more likely the auditor is to request higher audit
fees, thereby improving the quality of financial reports. Moreover,
when audit fees are lower, the BOD_index is significantly and nega-
tively associated with REM (see Models 4.9 and 4.10) and significantly
and positively associated with the FRQ_index (see Model 4.12),
suggesting that, when audit effort is lower, the strength of the board
plays a significant role in monitoring managers' opportunistic behav-
iour and improving the post-audit firm's financial reporting quality.
Companies with strong governance have lower audit risk and thus pay
lower audit fees because auditors are expected to put less effort into
reviewing their financial statements (Pucheta-Martínez et al., 2019).
Auditors may provide both audit and sustainability assurance ser-
vices to their clients, which may lead to differences in fees across
firms that use the same sustainability assurance provider as their
financial auditor as well as firms that use a different sustainability
assurance provider. In Table 4 Panel C, I divide the sample into firms
that have the same auditors performing both financial audit and sus-
tainability assurance (Models 4.13 to 4.16) and firms that use different
audit firms for their financial audit and sustainability assurance
(Models 4.17 to 4.20). Consistent with the previous findings, the
results show that companies that publish high-quality sustainability
reports are more likely to constrain earnings management and thus
improve financial reporting quality, as indicated by the coefficients of
SUSQUAL in all models except for Model 4.19. The main variable of
interest is the interaction term SUSQUAL* ln_AF, which captures the
13Despite the expected multicollinearity between SUSQUAL and SUSQUAL* ln_AF, the highest
VIF in all regressions throughout the paper is lower than 6.12, which mitigates potential
multicollinearity concerns (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 98).
14This result differs from the result reported in Greiner, Kohlbeck, and Smith (2016) that
auditors respond to aggressive income-increasing REM with higher audit fees due to the
additional effort needed to reduce audit risk and the increased perceived business risk.
However, the study's finding is limited to aggressive REM, defined as the top quintile
(i.e. higher-magnitude REM), where auditors may perceive lower-magnitude REM as ordinary
business operations.
15The percentage is calculated as [28.5065–25.1053] * [0.6198].
16The percentage is calculated as [28.5065–25.1053] * [0.4784].
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role of audit effort in the association between sustainability reporting
quality and post-audit financial reporting quality. The coefficient on
the interaction term SUSQUAL* ln_AF is positive and significant at the
1% level (see Model 4.13), 5% level (see Models 4.14 and 4.15) and
10% level (see Models 4.17 and 4.18). Moreover, the interaction term
SUSQUAL* ln_AF is significantly negatively associated with the
FRQ_index at the 1% level (see Model 4.16) and at the 5% level (see
Model 4.20). The results are consistent with Dal Maso et al. (2019),
indicating that the joint provision of financial audits and sustainability
assurance is unlikely to be driven by higher audit effort and supports
the argument that knowledge spillovers from the CSR assurance team
to the audit engagement team help the auditor to conduct more cost-
effective financial audits. However, the results show that the level of
audit effort is lower even when the financial audit and sustainability
assurance are provided by different audit firms, suggesting that com-
panies committed to higher sustainability reporting practices are more
likely to reduce auditors' concerns about the opportunistic use of sus-
tainability information and thus lower business risk (LópezPuertas-
Lamy et al., 2017). As a result, when business risk is low, concerns
about earnings management practice are low, which leads to less audit
effort and hence lower audit fees.17
5.3 | Robustness tests
I perform a number of robustness tests to verify the reliability of
the study's findings. Table 5 reports the results of replicating the
regressions performed in Table 3 using an alternative measure for
sustainability reporting quality. Following Rezaee and Tuo (2019), I
use a scale variable that measures the assurance level (EXT_Assure)
regarding whether corporate sustainability reports are accompanied
by external assurance and whether these reports are assured by a
professional auditor. The results show that the coefficient of
EXT_Assure is negative and significant at the 1% level with real earn-
ings management metrics (see Models 5.1 and 5.2) and is positive
and significant at the 1% level with the FRQ_index (see Model 5.4),
suggesting that companies publishing sustainability reports that are
externally assured by high-quality professional audits are more likely
to constrain earnings manipulation activities, thereby improving
financial reporting quality. Therefore, the robustness test supports
my first hypothesis on the positive association between sustainabil-
ity reporting quality and post-audit financial reporting quality.
Table 6 tests the moderating role of audit effort using an alter-
native measure for sustainability reporting quality, EXT-Assure, and
controlling for audit effort, proxied by audit fees, and interacting
with EXT-Assure. The results show positive and significant coeffi-
cients in Models 6.1 and 6.2 and a negative and significant coeffi-
cient in Model 6.4 for the interaction term EXT_Assure* ln_AF,
suggesting that audit effort moderates the role of sustainability
reporting quality in improving the firm's post-audit financial
17In another robustness test, I replace audit fees with total fees (i.e., the sum of audit fees,
audit-related fees and non-audit fees) and replicate the study's tests to consider the
assumption that auditors performing both financial audit and sustainability assurance may
exert more audit effort and charge higher non-audit fees, thus producing higher audit quality.
The (untabulated) results remain unchanged.
TABLE 5 Replicating the main findings using an alternative measure for sustainability reporting quality
REM REM_pmatch AEM FRQ_index
Model 5.1 Model 5.2 Model 5.3 Model 5.4
EXT_Assure −0.0902*** [−2.90] −0.1028*** [−3.32] −0.0022 [−0.87] 0.3239*** [−3.25]
CO2_emission 0.0334*** [5.54] 0.0359*** [6.14] −0.0027*** [−4.18] 0.1176*** [6.13]
SIZE −0.0083 [−0.98] −0.0053 [−0.64] −0.0001 [−0.18] −0.0151 [−0.57]
LEV 0.1974** [2.12] 0.2086** [2.15] −0.0108 [−1.41] 0.7680** [2.53]
ROA −1.3736*** [−5.21] −0.2332 [−1.03] 0.0708* [1.69] −2.6083*** [−3.58]
LIQUIDITY 0.4351*** [5.24] 0.3595*** [4.33] 0.0237*** [2.79] 1.6193*** [6.39]
MTB 0.0021 [1.11] 0.0018 [0.97] −0.0003* [−1.79] 0.0078 [1.23]
LOSS −0.0923* [−1.86] −0.0793* [−1.83] 0.0038 [0.63] −0.2907** [−2.15]
TENURE −0.0038 [−1.28] −0.0050* [−1.82] 0 [0.07] −0.0077 [−0.82]
BOD_index −0.0098 [−0.72] −0.0071 [−0.54] −0.0017* [−1.78] 0.0442 [1.07]
Industry Included Included Included Included
Year Included Included Included Included
Intercept −0.164 [−0.86] −0.2921 [−1.52] −0.0473*** [−2.91] −1.1527* [−1.88]
R2 0.1373 0.0828 0.3545 0.122
N 1,186 1,186 1,186 1,186
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
Variables are as defined in Appendix A.
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reporting quality and thus supporting my second hypothesis
that the positive association between sustainability reporting quality
and post-audit financial reporting quality is conditioned by audit
effort.
5.4 | Testing for endogeneity issues
I strengthen the evidence and address the endogeneity issue that may
result from model misspecification and assumptions about the
TABLE 6 The moderating role of audit effort using an alternative measure for sustainability reporting quality
REM REM_pmatch AEM FRQ_index
Model 6.1 Model 6.2 Model 6.3 Model 6.4
EXT_Assure −0.9305*** [−2.68] −1.5184*** [−4.14] −0.0128 [−0.36] 3.8445*** [3.37]
ln_AF −0.1708*** [−4.10] −0.2185*** [−4.90] 0.0096** [2.15] 0.5749*** [4.13]
EXT_Assure* ln_AF 0.0614** [2.57] 0.1024*** [4.07] 0.0006 [0.26] −0.2552*** [−3.23]
CO2_emission 0.0599*** [5.31] 0.0524*** [4.93] −0.0070*** [−7.46] −0.1742*** [−4.87]
SIZE −0.0078 [−0.80] −0.0024 [−0.26] −0.0006 [−0.75] 0.017 [0.56]
LEV 0.2698** [2.42] 0.2838** [2.51] −0.0141* [−1.87] −1.0221*** [−2.88]
ROA −1.3474*** [−4.71] −0.1982 [−0.81] 0.0575 [1.33] 2.5203*** [3.20]
LIQUIDITY 0.2988*** [3.08] 0.2599*** [2.64] 0.0372*** [4.08] −1.3728*** [−4.66]
MTB 0.0029 [1.53] 0.0025 [1.31] −0.0003* [−1.69] −0.0098 [−1.49]
LOSS −0.0772 [−1.37] −0.0578 [−1.19] 0.0025 [0.37] 0.2306 [1.54]
TENURE −0.0033 [−0.96] −0.0053* [−1.67] −0.0004 [−1.12] 0.0077 [0.72]
BOD_index −0.0092 [−0.68] −0.0039 [−0.30] −0.0014 [−1.49] 0.0377 [0.91]
Industry Included Included Included Included
Year Included Included Included Included
Intercept 1.5868** [2.56] 2.2579*** [3.41] −0.0537 [−0.84] −5.5574*** [−2.73]
R2 0.1638 0.1125 0.3974 0.1395
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
Variables are as defined in Appendix A.
TABLE 7 Sustainability reporting quality and post-audit financial reporting quality using the propensity score matching technique
REM REM_pmatch AEM FRQ_index
Model 7.1 Model 7.2 Model 7.3 Model 7.4
SUSQUAL −0.0386** [−2.28] −0.0495* [−1.71] −0.0013 [−0.53] 0.1763** [1.97]
CO2_emission 0.0158*** [3.28] 0.0227*** [2.75] −0.0065*** [−9.12] −0.0846*** [−3.85]
SIZE −0.0151** [−2.25] 0.0025 [0.21] 0.0088*** [8.85] 0.0146 [0.57]
LEV 0.0860* [1.78] 0.2100** [2.54] −0.0162** [−2.27] −0.7924*** [−3.05]
ROA −0.8390*** [−7.30] −0.1868 [−0.94] 0.0314* [1.82] 3.5547*** [5.49]
LIQUIDITY 0.1735*** [3.75] 0.2578*** [3.32] 0.0354*** [5.29] −0.9889*** [−3.90]
MTB 0.0007 [0.71] −0.0005 [−0.34] −0.0002 [−1.19] −0.0066 [−1.21]
LOSS −0.0853*** [−3.04] −0.1485*** [−3.01] 0.0021 [0.50] 0.6235*** [4.01]
TENURE −0.0022 [−1.26] −0.0055* [−1.85] −0.0007*** [−2.66] 0.0159 [1.63]
BOD_index −0.0031 [−0.56] −0.0139 [−1.45] −0.0009 [−1.07] 0.0277 [0.82]
Industry Included Included Included Included
Year Included Included Included Included
Intercept −0.2278** [−2.13] −0.2321** [−2.30] −0.0193 [−1.21] 1.2132** [2.03]
R2 0.1346 0.0651 0.3354 0.0865
N 990 990 990 990
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
Variables are as defined in Appendix A.
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functional relationship between variables by testing the main
findings on a matched sample using a PSM technique. I create
the variable SUSQUAL_indicator, which equals one for observations
where SUSQUAL is greater than the median value and zero
for observations where it is less than the median value. I first run a
probit model that uses SUSQUAL_indicator as the dependent variable
and the variables that determine sustainability reporting quality, such
as SIZE, LEV, ROA, LIQUIDITY, MTB and BOD_index, as regressors. I
then estimate the propensity score and match it for each
year–industry group using a 1% radius matching approach (Shipman,
Swanquist, & Whited, 2017). This produces a combined sample of
990 observations. I also apply the PSM technique using the alternative
measure of sustainability reporting quality, EXT_Assure, and create an
indicator variable, Assurance_indicator, which equals one for observa-
tions where EXT_Assure is greater than the median value and zero for
observations where it is less than the median value. Table 7 Models
7.1 to 7.4 use SUSQUAL_indicator, whereas Models 7.5 to 7.8 use
Assurance_indicator. These models are analogous to those in previous
tables in terms of their dependent variables. The results (see Table 7)
report the second-stage regressions and confirm the main findings
and the absence of endogeneity bias. I also use the same matching
technique for an analysis that addresses the moderating role of audit
effort and present the second-stage regression results in Table 8. The
results remain unchanged and confirm the moderating role of audit
effort in the association between sustainability reporting quality and
post-audit financial reporting quality.18
6 | CONCLUSION
This study investigates the association between sustainability
reporting quality and post-audit financial reporting quality and exam-
ines whether this association is conditional on audit effort. I measure
sustainability reporting quality using an index that goes beyond mere
sustainability disclosures and compliance levels and is based on the
existence of specific sustainability reporting practices that signal sus-
tainability report quality. I also measure post-audit financial reporting
quality using accrual-based earnings, real earnings management and
an index for financial reporting quality. Using data from a sample of
FTSE 350 listed firms covering 2007 to 2018, I show that firms that
produce high-quality sustainability reports are significantly and nega-
tively associated with earnings management metrics and therefore
help improve post-audit financial reporting quality. The results also
show that the association between sustainability reporting quality and
post-audit financial reporting quality is moderated by audit effort. This
study's findings hold for a matched sample analysis using PSM. I argue
that firms that devote more resources to produce high-quality sustain-
ability reports are likely to demonstrate an overall commitment to
quality, which alleviates auditors' concerns related to the opportunis-
tic use of sustainability reporting and reduces business risk, thereby
reducing the effort auditors expend to verify financial reports.
This study's findings have implications for corporate managers,
who need to place more emphasis on the importance of corporate
ethics and sustainability in their organisations and to learn how to
enhance the credibility of nonfinancial disclosures. Doing so will help
reduce the prevalence of earnings manipulation and improve the
TABLE 8 The moderating role of audit effort using the propensity score matching technique
REM REM_pmatch DACC FRQ_index
SUSQUAL −0.1330*** [−2.61] −0.1743*** [−3.39] 0.0046 [0.59] 0.9183*** [3.00]
ln_AF −0.0657*** [−3.85] −0.0782*** [−4.61] 0.0071*** [2.80] 0.4225*** [4.18]
SUSQUAL* ln_AF 0.0055* [1.79] 0.0085*** [2.67] −0.0003 [−0.59] −0.0420** [−2.22]
COE2_emission 0.0375*** [5.00] 0.0317*** [4.43] −0.0097*** [−9.10] −0.1873*** [−4.40]
SIZE −0.0014 [−0.11] 0.0153 [1.29] 0.0078*** [4.39] −0.0576 [−0.81]
LEV 0.1702** [2.37] 0.2113*** [3.08] −0.0193* [−1.88] −1.1430*** [−2.79]
ROA −0.9383*** [−5.69] −0.0859 [−0.54] 0.0471** [2.00] 2.6999*** [2.87]
LIQUIDITY 0.2117*** [2.96] 0.1430** [2.09] 0.0283*** [2.77] −1.0355** [−2.54]
MTB 0.0019* [1.66] 0.0014 [1.27] −0.0002 [−0.94] −0.0096 [−1.47]
LOSS −0.0712 [−1.63] −0.0601 [−1.46] 0.0068 [1.11] 0.3582 [1.46]
TENURE −0.0017 [−0.66] −0.0027 [−1.12] −0.0005 [−1.43] 0.0136 [0.95]
BOD_index −0.0131* [−1.67] −0.0128* [−1.72] −0.0014 [−1.24] 0.0775* [1.74]
Industry Included Included Included Included
Year Included Included Included Included
Intercept 0.0297 [0.11] −0.2281 [−0.85] −0.1123*** [−2.80] 0.4834 [0.30]
R2 0.2118 0.1436 0.4178 0.1496
N 990 990 990 990
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
Note: Variables are as defined in Appendix A.
18The untabulated first-stage regression results can be provided upon request.
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quality of financial reporting. Managers need to adopt an approach
that integrates sustainable business practices into operational decision
making and set corporate targets that emphasise a good relationship
with stakeholders. This study might also help stakeholders understand
the implications of managers' social and financial choices and to iden-
tify the costs and benefits of these choices. This study's findings also
have implications for corporate boards, who need to establish dedi-
cated committees specialised in sustainability-related tasks and pro-
vide an independent external assurance that helps stakeholders
assess the quality of sustainability reports; this should increase trans-
parency and affect management discretion in the financial reporting
process.
This study has several limitations that provide opportunities for
future research. First, the study's sample is based on FTSE 350 listed
firms and is thus restricted to relatively large firms. Future studies
may expand the sample to include smaller firms and firms in other
institutional contexts where the governance of sustainability
reporting is different. Second, in addition to the several reporting
practices considered in this study to build the sustainability
reporting quality index, future research can explore the quality of
sustainability reporting by developing measures obtained from tex-
tual analysis. Overall, this study contributes to the accounting litera-
ture by providing new evidence for the debate regarding the
association between sustainability-related practices and post-audit
financial reporting quality and, more broadly, to the management lit-
erature on corporate sustainability practices.
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITION
APPENDIX B: EARNINGS MANAGEMENT MEASURES
B.1 | Real earnings management
I consider three metrics to study the level of real activity manipula-
tions, that is, the abnormal levels of cash flow from operations
(ABN_CFO), discretionary expenses (ABN_DISX) and production costs
(ABN_PROD). Abnormal cash flows from operations are estimated as
the deviations from the predicted values from the following industry-
year regression:
CFOit
Assetsit−1
= α1
1
Assetsit−1
 
+ α2
SALESit
Assetsit−1
 
+ α3
ΔSALESit
Assetsit−1
 
+ εijt,
ðB1Þ
where CFO is the cash flow from operations, SALES are annual sales
revenues and ASSETS are total assets. Abnormal production costs are
estimated as the deviations from the predicted values from the fol-
lowing industry-year regression:
PRODit
Assetsit−1
= α1
1
Assetsit−1
 
+ α2
SALESit
Assetsit−1
 
+
α3
ΔSALESit
Assetsit−1
 
+ α4
ΔSALESit−1
Assetsit−1
 
+ εijt,
ðB2Þ
where PROD are production costs, defined as the sum of cost of
goods sold and change in inventory during the year. Abnormal
REM
An aggregate measure of real earnings
management activities calculated as the sum of
abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by
negative one and abnormal production costs
REM_pmatch Performance-matched real earnings management
proxy following Kothari et al. (2005)
AEM Discretionary accruals estimated using the modified
Jones (1991) model
FRQ_index The FRQ Index is computed by taking the three
proxies (REM, REM_pmatch, AEM) and estimating
the principal-component analysis (PCA) multiplied
by minus one so that it is increasing in reporting
quality following Biddle et al. (2009).
SUSQUAL SUSQUAL = sustainability reporting quality on a
0–5 scale [0 = no sustainability reports exist;
1 = sustainability reports exist; 2 = sustainability
reports exist and the company has a sustainability
committee affiliated with the board of directors;
3 = sustainability reports exist and the reports are
externally assured by an independent external
assurance; 4 = sustainability reports exist and the
reports are externally assured by a high quality
professional auditor; 5 = executive compensation
is linked to CSR/sustainability targets (other
criteria should be fulfilled to achieve the highest
score).
EXT_Assure The quality of external of assurance [0 = if no
assurance service is provided; 1 = assurance is
provided by a non-accounting firm; 2 = assurance
is provided by high quality professional auditor]
CO2_emission The natural logarithm of total carbon emissions in
thousands of metric tons in year t − 1
SIZE Firm size calculated as the natural logarithm of
market capitalisation
LEV Ratio of total debt to total assets
ROA Return on assets ratio calculated as net income
divided by total assets
LIQUIDITY Liquidity measure calculated as the sum of accounts
receivable and inventory to total assets
REM
An aggregate measure of real earnings
management activities calculated as the sum of
abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by
negative one and abnormal production costs
MTB Market-to-book ratio calculated as the market value
of equity to the book value of equity
LOSS An indicator variable equal to one when the current
year's net income is negative, and zero otherwise
TENURE The number of years of the audit engagement
BOD_index Index that measures the quality of the corporate
board computed by totalling the proxies of five
board characteristics:
BODSIZE: Dummy variable if the number of board
members is higher than the industry median, 1;
otherwise, 0
BODIND: Dummy variable if the percentage of
independent directors on the board is higher than
the industry median, 1; otherwise, 0
BODMEET: Dummy variable if the number of board
meetings is higher than the industry median, 1;
otherwise, 0
BODEXP: Dummy variable if the percentage of
board members with financial expertise is higher
than the industry median, 1; otherwise, 0
DUALITY: Dummy variable if the chief executive
officer (CEO) and board chair role are separate, 1;
otherwise, 0
ln_AF The natural logarithm of the total fees charged by
the auditor for the audit work
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discretionary expenses are estimated as the deviations from the
predicted values from the following industry-year regression:
DISXit
Assetsit−1
= α1
1
Assetsit−1
 
+ α2
SALESit−1
Assetsit−1
 
+ εijt, ðB3Þ
where DISX are discretionary expenses during the year, defined as
the sum of advertising expenses, R&D expenses, and SG&A.19 Firms
can artificially inflate reported earnings by having unusually low cash
flow from operations, and/or unusually low discretionary expenses,
and/or unusually high production costs. To capture the total effects
of real earnings management, I follow Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and
use an aggregate measure of real earnings management (REM) calcu-
lated as the sum of abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by
negative one (so that the higher the amount, the more likely it is that
the firm is cutting discretionary expenses) and abnormal production
costs (increasing production to spread the fixed costs of production
over a large number of units).
B.2 | Accrual-based earnings management
I define discretionary accruals as the difference between total accruals
and the fitted nondiscretionary accruals:
AEMi,t = TAi,t=Assetsi,t−1ð Þ−NAi,t½ :: ðB4Þ
Prior studies often rely on the Jones model (Jones, 1991) or the
modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) to calculate earnings
management (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Dechow et al., 1998;
Doukakis, 2014; Mouselli et al., 2012; Qi et al., 2017). Jones (1991)
proposed a model that controls for the effect of changes in a firm's
characteristics on nondiscretionary accruals. The model implicitly
assumes that revenues are nondiscretionary. The Jones model for
nondiscretionary accruals is estimated as follows:
NAit = ά1
1
Assetsit−1
 
+ ά2
ΔREVit
Assetsit−1
 
+ ά3
PPEit
Assetsit−1
 
, ðB5Þ
where ΔREVit represents changes in revenues from the preceding
year, Assetsit − 1 represents total assets, PPEit is the gross value of
property, plant and equipment, and ά1, ά2, ά3 represent the coeffi-
cient estimates of the firm-specific parameters, which are generated
using the following model:
TAit
Assetsit−1
= α1
1
Assetsit−1
 
+ α2
ΔREVit
Assetsit−1
 
+ α3
PPEit
Assetsit−1
 
+ εijt,
ðB6Þ
where α1, α2 and α3 are estimates generated from OLS regression for
all sample firms in each ICB industry. Consistent with prior studies, I
use net income before extraordinary items minus cash from opera-
tions to calculate total accruals (TA).
The modified Jones model implicitly assumes that discretion is
exercised over the recognition of revenues on credit sales; thus, all
changes in credit sales result from earnings management. In the modi-
fied Jones model, the coefficient estimates from Equation B6 are used
to estimate the firm-specific nondiscretionary accruals for our sample
firms as follows:
NAit = ά1
1
Assetsit−1
 
+ ά2
ΔREVit−ΔRECit
Assetsit−1
 
+ ά3
PPEit
Assetsit−1
 
: ðB7Þ
Discretionary accruals are calculated as the difference between
total accruals and the fitted nondiscretionary accruals obtained using
Equation (B4).
B.3 | Performance-matched earnings management proxies
Prior research on accrual-based earnings management suggests that
discretionary accrual models might be misspecified when applied to
firms with extreme financial performance (e.g., Dechow et al., 1995;
Kothari et al., 2005). The discretionary accrual measure based on
Kothari et al. (2005) is adjusted for the accrual performance of a mat-
ched firm where matching is on the basis of return on assets and the
industry (AEM_pmatch). The same concern may apply to the real earn-
ings management measures (Cheng et al., 2016). Therefore, I use a
similar research design as proposed in Kothari et al. (2005) and esti-
mate the performance-matched real earnings management proxies
(REM_pmatch).
19Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010), advertising expenses and R&D are set to zero if they
are missing as long as SG&A is available.
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